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Abstract:
Both theory and the empirical evidence for a broad range of countries have identified a
negative relationship between domestic and foreign saving.  Still, based on the experience of the
1990s, a popular view has emerged that domestic and foreign saving are positively related in Asia
and negatively related in Latin America. We argue that this popular discussion does not
discriminate between trends in domestic saving (which are very different in the two regions) and
the cyclical component of saving, which is linked to capital flows. We show that, when trend and
cyclical components of domestic saving and capital flows are properly taken into account, the two
regions do not differ in the short-run response of domestic saving to capital inflows.  We conclude
that the main differences pertain to the long-run behavior of saving rates, which are driven by
trends in demographic factors, per capita GDP, and other factors that have little to do with
fluctuations in capital flows.  
Key words: capital flows, domestic saving, East Asia, Latin America
     2 See Montiel and Reinhart (1997) for a review of this literature.
     3 See Díaz-Alejandro (1983) and Eichengreen (1991).
     4 See Calvo and Reinhart (1996).  For the purposes of this paper the term East Asia will refer
to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; besides China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand have been the largest capital importers during the 1990s.
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I. Introduction
The resurgence of international capital flows to developing countries in the early 1990´s 
gave rise to an abundant literature on the causes and consequences of these flows. The
widespread nature of the phenomenon led researchers to emphasize the role of external factors,
which were found to account for a substantial portion of the surge in capital flows in the early
1990´s.2  Moreover, history had also shown that external factors have an important cyclical
component, leading to repeated booms and busts in international capital flows.3  This body f
evidence gave rise to fears about the vulnerability of capital-importing economies to abrupt
reversals in capital flows.
In late 1994, the worst fears came true. The devaluation of the peso by Mexican
authorities triggered an abrupt outflow of capital from Mexico.  The financial turbulence that
followed quickly spread to several countries in Latin America.  In contrast, large recipients of
capital in East Asia remained largely unscathed, as the turbulence there was confined to a couple
of days in mid-January 1995.4 
At that time, the received wisdom held that Latin America was far more vulnerable to
shifts in investor sentiment and international capital movements than East Asia and that this
greater vulnerability was “somehow” related to regional differences in how domestic saving
     5 Of course, the Thai currency crisis in the summer of 1997 and its domino effect in East Asia
has led to a drastic revision of that view.
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responded to an increase in capital inflows.5  In particular, this view emphasized that widening
current account deficits were largely invested in East Asia (in fact, saving increased but by less
than investment), but were associated with a large decline in saving rates in Latin America
(although investment also increased).  These differences in the macroeconomic outcomes
provided the basis to the notion that capital inflows were somehow complements o domestic
saving in Asia and substitutes in Latin America.  
The fact that national and foreign saving appear to be positively correlated in East Asia
and negatively correlated in Latin America, however, should be somewhat surprising.  For
instance, Obtsfeld (1995) presents a review of the empirical evidence on the impact of capital
flows on saving and concludes that the weight of the accumulated evidence suggests that net
foreign resource inflows are negatively related to national saving and positively related to
domestic investment.  On theoretical grounds, standard intertemporal models show that shocks
that emporarily increase capital inflows are unambiguosly associated with a temporary decline
in domestic saving.  
In light of the unresolved conflict between the implications of theory and the empirical
evidence at one end of the spectrum and the received wisdom at the other end, this paper
reassesses the relationship between national and foreign saving in East Asia and Latin America.  
Our approach differs from other papers that have analyzed this issue in a variety of ways: First, it
is highly ecclectic, in that we systematically examine whether there are possible regional
differences in household preferences, the incidence of liquidity constraints, the prevalence of
4consumption smoothing, the determinants of saving rates, and the macroeconomic policy response
to the suge in capital inflows; Second, unlike most of the papers on these varied topics, our focus
is on a narrower East Asia-Latin American comparison, rather than more global in scope; Third,
unlike most of the studies that have examined the relationship between domestic and foreign
saving in the context of a panel of countries (which we also do) we analyze this link at the
individual country level.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents a simple theoretical
framework to illustrate how exogenous changes in world nominal and real interest rates and the
relaxation of borrowing contraints affect national and foreign saving.  Section III reviews the
empirical literature that may provide an explanation for the possible differences in the relationship
between domestic and foreign saving in Asia and Latin America.  Section IV reasseses that
relationship by examining the cyclical and secular behavior of the variables of interest while
Section V concludes.
II. A Simple Model
In this section we develop a simple monetary model à la Calvo and Végh (1993) to
illustrate the impact of a variety of external shocks on the path of consumption, saving, the
current account, and the capital account.  At the outset it is important to emphasize that this is not
a model of economic growth, so that the comovements among endogenous variables should be
thought of as describing cyclical, not secular, effects.
a. The model
Consider a small open economy with a representative consumer that derives utility from
the consumption of a non-storable, tradable good. Lifetime utility is given by,
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where the instantaneous utility function, U(.) is assumed to be increasing, twice continuously
differentiable, and strictly concave; ct denotes consumption, â is the subjective discount rate andqt
is a preference shock. Consumers can hold two type of assets: domestic non-interest bearing
money and an internationally traded bond that pays a rate of interest equal to .  rt
 denotes financial wealth of the representative consumer, where mt and bt are al monetarywt
balances and the stock of private bond holdings, respectively.
The consumer must use money to carry out her or his consumption purchases. Formally,
she/he faces a liquidity-in-advance constraint,
which implies that real money balances are proportional to the value of consumption expenditures.
Constraint (3) will hold with equality in equilibrium if the nominal interest rate is positive. The
evolution of the stock of private financial wealth is governed by the following,
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where y denotes the endowment flow of the consumption good and i den tes the instantaneous
nominal interest rate in terms of domestic currency. We assume perfect capital mobility which
implies,
where  are the world nominal interest rate and inflation rate, respectively.  Foreign inflationi (,å(
is assumed to be constant unless otherwise noted.
Using equations (3) and (4), and imposing the appropriate transversality conditions we can
derive the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative consumer, which is given by
This equation says that the present value of consumption purchases cannot exceed the present
value of the consumer’s endowment stream and its initial level of wealth.
The consumer’s optimization problem consists of choosing the path of ct so as to
maximize lifetime utility, equation (1), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, equation
(6). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are:
where ë is the (time invariant) Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (6).
Equation (7) indicates that (when ) at the optimum the marginal utility of consumption isrs ' â
     6 The impact of the relaxation of borrowing constraints in an economy with capital is analyzed
in Obtsfeld (1995). In Obtsfeld’s example, the relaxation of borrowing constraints implies that the
economy is allowed to borrow a fixed amount per period, not previously available, at an interest
rate which is below the subjective discount rate.
     7 A temporary stabilization (a reduction in å), such as the one considered by Calvo and Végh
(1993) would generate a similar path for .t
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pt ' p
L 0#t<T
pt ' p¯t t$T
(8)
proportional to the effective price of consumption, pt.  The effective price of consumption is given
by the price of the consumption good plus the opportunity cost of holding money that is needed
to purchase goods, deflated by . qt
b. External shocks
First, let us consider a situation in which the effective price of consumption,, ispt
temporarily low due to a temporary reduction in the world nominal interest rate (arising from a
temporary decline in the world inflation rate) or a temporary relaxation of borrowing constraints
(which in this simple economy we will interpret as an increase in) that allows the economy toqt
borrow on better terms for any given level of r.6 Formally, assume
where .7p L < p¯
Let us assume further, that  for all t. Then, from the first order conditions ofrs ' r ' â
the consumer (7), it is clear that consumption is constant in both periods, but higher when the
effective price of consumption is low. Therefore, for a constant path of income, any external
shock that allows to the economy to consume at a temporarily lower cost, trigggers an expansion
in consumption, a decline in the saving rate and a widening of the current account deficit.
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The extent of the decline in saving rates and the resulting current account deficit will
depend on the magnitude of the change in  and the properties of the utility function. Hence, forpt
instance, if the prevalence of liquidity constraints was greater in Latin America than in Asia, one
could conjecture that the change in was larger in the former than in the latter.  To assess thept
role played by preferences, lets assume U(c) tak s the iso-elastic form,
where ñ > 0 is the (constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES).  Specializing the first
order conditions (7) using (9) we obtain
Equation (10) says that the magnitude of the response of consumption, saving and the current
account will be larger, the larger is the IES (for any given change in ) and the larger is thept
change in  (for a given ñ).  Irrespective of the orders of magnitude, the qualitative predictionspt
of the model imply a negative correlation between national saving and foreign saving.
Let us now consider a situation in which the world real interest rate is temporarily low.
Formally assume,
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Assuming a constant path for , and differentiating the first order conditions (7) with respect topt
time, we obtain the law of motion that governs the path of consumption, which is given by
which implies by (11)
Because consumption falls in the [0,T)  interval and remains constant thereafter, it must be the
case that it jumps at the instant when world interest rates fall, for the intertemporal budget
constraint to hold. Therefore, for a constant path of income, a temporary decline in world real
interest rate also trigggers an increase in consumption (a decline in the saving rate), and, as shown
in equation (14) below, a widening of the current account deficit (i.e. a bigger capital account
surplus). 
However, in contrast to the previous exercise, consumption declines from the (initially) high levels
until t=T.  After the intial decline, saving recovers and the current account improves. The
correlation between national saving and foreign saving is again predicted to be negative.
III. Do Regional Preferences Differ?
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In the previous section, we showed that whether the cause of the capital inflow was
external or domestic, the extent to which changes in domestic and foreign saving were linked to
these shocks depended importantly on household preferences--particularly on the extent of
intertemporal substitution.  Furthermore, the presence of binding liquidity or borrowing
constraints also plays an important role in determining the impact of an increase in foreign saving
on domestic saving.
In this section, we review the empirical literature that has estimated preference parameters
or gauged the extent of liquidity constraints for developing countries.  We also review a related
strand of the literature that has focused on the estimation of reduced-form saving equations.
Because the main focus of this paper is to compare Asia and Latin America, we restrict our
attention to studies that allow us to disentangle regional differences.
a.  Preference parameters
As Section II highlights, the extent to which domestic saving decreases in response to a
shock that increases foreign saving depends importantly on the IES.  The theoretical framework
suggests that the higher the IES, the larger is the increase in consumption (decline in saving)
associated with any given temporary decline in domestic interest rates.  Unfortunately, relatively
few studies have attempted to estimate the IES for developing countries in Asia and Latin
America; Table 1 provides a brief synthesis of the relevant studies.  
Giovannini (1985) is the first to explicitly estimate the IES for developing countries.  He
uses a one-good linearized model and the main conclusion that emerges from that study is that in
most instances, irrespective of the country or the region considered, the IES is not significantly
different from zero.  Rossi (1988), who allows for liquidity constraints in a model similar to
     8  When the early debt crisis years--1982 and 1983--are excluded from the sample, the IES for
the South American panel is significantly different from zero; the estimate is 0.09 and the
corresponding standard error is 0.04.
     9  Ogaki and Reinhart (1995) show, in the context of a two-good model of durable and non-
durable goods, that by ignoring nonseparability of preferences the Hall-type specification
introduces a downward bias in the estimator of the IES.  
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Giovannini’s, reaches similar conclusions.  As Table 1 details, Rossi finds that the IES is small and
close to zero for the Asian countries as well as for the South American countries; 0.07 and 0.09,
respectively.8  For Central American and Caribbean countries, which includes Mexico, his
estimate of the IES is higher (0.37) and statistically significant. Taking these results at face value,
it would imply that the kinds of shocks discussed in the preceding section would have little or no
impact on domestic consumption patterns except for the Central American group.  
However, as shown in Ostry and Reinhart (1992), such restrictive models may suffer from
a serious specification bias.9  Using a two-good CES utility specification, that disaggregates
among traded and non-traded goods, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) obtain estimates of the IES for a
pooled group of five Asian and for four Latin American countries.  In both groups of countries
the IES is significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels and point estimates fall in
the 0.4 to 0.8 range.  Indeed, the point estimate of the IES for the Asian countries is higher than
that for the Latin American countries, suggesting that, if anything, the decline in domestic saving
due to a temporary decline in interest rates should be higher for Asia.  Since the original paper
does not formally test for regional differences, we employ their estimates (as well as the
corresponding standard errors) to test whether the difference between Asia and Latin America is
significant or not.  Our null hypothesis is that the IES is equal () in both groups ofóA ' óLA
     10  Details on country coverage are provided in Table 1.
     11  See Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996) for country-specific estimates.
     12 Using an entirely different approach Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994) test whether cultural
factors influence saving.  Using data from the Canadian Survey of Family Expenditures he
compare the saving behavior of immigrants from different parts of the world to Canada; they find
no evidence of differences.
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countries.  The test results, which are reported in Table 1, do not allow us to reject that
hypothesis at standard confidence levels.
 Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996) extend this framework by allowing the IES to vary with
level of wealth, along the lines suggested by a Stone-Geary utility function.  Their results show
important regional differences in the estimates of the IES; however, the key difference occurs
among the extremely poor countries, mostly sub-Saharan Africa, and everyone else. Specifically,
for countries in which consumption is close to subsistence levels, the IES is close to zero and
saving is not responsive to changes in interest rates.  However, as Table 1 highlights, Asian and
Latin American countries  yield estimates of the IES that are fairly similar to one another.10 The
average IES for the Asian countries at about 0.39 while that for the Latin American countries
averages 0.56.  Further, when we restrict out attention to the countries of most interest for the
purposes of this paper--namely, the heavy capital inflow recipients in both regions in the 1990s
(denoted by an asterisk)--the differences all but disappear.  The IES estimate for that subset of
Asian countries averages 0.54, while the Latin American countries average 0.60.11
The previous discussion would suggest that there is little evidence to suggest systematic
and important differences in a key preference parameter (the IES) among Asian an Latin
American countries.12  Hence, to capture a different response in Asia versus Latin America of
domestic saving to shocks that alter foreign saving, we would have to find grounds on other
     13  Liquidity constraints are most important for Asian low-income countries, where the share of
households estimated to be liquidity constrained is 0.75.
13
explanations which do not depend on consumer preferences.  
One possibility, discussed by Obstfeld (1995), is that the proportion of the capital inflows
that gets consumed depends positively on the incidence of liquidity or borrowing constraints. 
Next, we ask: Are liquidity constraints more binding in Latin America than in Asia?
b.  Liquidity constraints
The empirical literature that attempts to gauge the incidence of liquidity constraints or the
ability of agents to smooth consumption intertemporally in developing countries is also rather
scanty.  Table 2 sketches the country coverage and some of the main results of studies that enable
us to undertake a comparison among our two regions of interest.
Rossi (1988 and 1989) estimates that liquidity constraints are significant in both Asia and
South America, but quantitatively more important for the latter among the middle income
countries (see Table 2).13  However, for the Central American countries, which includes the
largest capital importer in Latin America in the 1990s--Mexico, liquidity constraints were not
found to be significant.
Haque and Montiel (1989) provide country-specific estimates of the share of households
that are liquidity constrained.  From these estimates one can construct regional averages.  For the
six Asian countries in their sample, they estimate the share of liquidity-constrained households at
about 0.38; the estimated share of households for the Latin American and Caribbean countries in
their sample is noticeably smaller, at 0.22.  These results imply that the increase in consumption
due to a rise in foreign saving would be greater in Asia than in Latin America.  However, the
14
problem with the Haque and Montiel (1989) sample is that ,while the Asian sample includes a
number of the heavy capital inflow countries of interest (see Table 2), the Latin American sample
is not representative of the large capital importers of that region.  
A more recent paper by Vaidyanathan (1993), which attempts to link the incidence of
liquidity constraints to a country's level of development (proxied by a variety of social and
economic indicators), provides a broader country coverage.  As before, we report regional
averages based on the country specific estimates provided in the original paper.  These results
suggest liquidity constraints may be more important in Latin America than in Asia, with 72
percent of households subject to liquidity constraints in the former versus 47 percent in the latter. 
However, when we limit our attention to the heavy capital inflow recipients of the 1990s, this gap
narrows substantially; the average share of liquidity-constrained households for the Asian capital
importers is estimated at 0.45, while the comparable share for the largest inflow recipients in Latin
America, is 0.56.
Ghosh and Ostry (1995), offer an alternative strategy to assess households’ ability to
smooth consumption intertemporally in developing countries in the context of an intertemporal
model of the current account.  They employ three criteria to test whether the null hypothesis of
consumption smoothing is consistent with the observed data.  First, they test whether the
detrended current account helps predict subsequent movements in national cash flow.  For
example, if agents expect national cash flow to fall, they would optimally run a current account
surplus (an increase in domestic saving) today.  The emphasis on the "detrended" current account
stems from the desire to abstract from long-term trends in domestic and foreign saving that stem
from demographic and institutional factors and focus on the consumption-smoothing component. 
     14  Although Rossi finds that liquidity constraints were not binding in his Central America and
Caribbean panel.
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Second, they test the parameter restrictions implied by theory and lastly they test for the equality
of variances of the actual and optimal consumption-smoothing current account predicted under
the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing.  In five out of eleven Asian countries in their
sample they reject the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing by two or more criteria; for
Latin America, the rejection rate is somewhat lower, with the null hypothesis rejected only in six
out of sixteen cases.  For the large capital importers in their sample, the rejection rate is also
heavier in Asia.
Taken together these studies suggest liquidity constraints may be empirically important,
with either a substantive portion of households subject to borrowing constraints or a rejection in
some countries of the implications of consumption smoothing.   As discussed in Obstfeld (1995), 
this tends to amplify the increase in consumption that one should expect when international
borrowing constraints are relaxed (i.e., when foreign saving increases).   However, the differences
across regions are less clear cut.  Rossi’s (1988 and 1989) and Vaidyanathan's (1993) results
show that liquidity constraints may be more (quantitatively) important in Latin America than in
Asia.14  This would suggest that an exogenous increase in foreign saving would lead to a bigger
boom in consumption in Latin America than in Asia.  However, Gosh and Ostry (1995) reject the
null hypothesis of consumption smoothing in a higher share of the Asian countries (nearly one half
of them) than in the Latin American counterparts (about one-third) they examine.  As with the
IES, it is difficult to decisively posit a different response to a surge in capital inflows in the two
regions on the basis of these results.
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c.  Reduced-form saving equations  
We now turn our attention to the literature that examined saving behavior by focusing on
reduced-form equations.  Edwards (1995) focusing on six Asian countries (see Table 3) and eight
Latin American countries and finds that demographics, government saving, growth per capita, and
foreign saving are important determinants of private saving in both regions.  Indeed, the variables
that are found to account for the bulk of the markedly higher saving rates in Asia are typically
associated with factors that influence the trend, not the cycle.  Demographic factors, particularly
dependency ratios and the extent of financial deepening, stand out in this list.  Evidence of the
importance of demographic trends in explaining saving rates in both regions are also found in
Doshii (1994).  
Faruqee and Husain (1995), who examine the long-run determinants of saving in four key
East Asian countries, in the context of a cointegration model reach a similar conclusion on the
importance of demographic factors in explaining the trend in the saving rate and to a lesser extent
financial deepening and “forced saving” in the form of compulsory pension plans.  Cyclical
fluctuations around that trend, they find,  are importantly driven by growth.  Held and Uthoff
(1994), who examine 15 Latin American countries, also conclude demographics play an important
role in explaining saving behavior.  Collectively, these results would suggest that marked
differences in the r nds in saving in the two regions can be traced to secular developments
affecting demographics and the stability and growth of the financial sector.  
As to the link between domestic and foreign saving, Eichengreen (1993) and Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) have argued that capital flows have been shown to have an
important temporary or cyclical component--this is precisely the "cyclical" link examined in
     15  For a recent survey of this literature see Schmidt-Hebbel, Servén, and Solimano (1996).
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Section II.  Edwards (1995) concludes that there are no statistically significant differences in the
response of domestic saving to changes in foreign saving among the Asian and Latin American
countries.  He finds that in both regions domestic and foreign saving are substitutes--a one
percent increase in foreign saving is associated with about a 0.50 to 0.63 percent decline in
domestic saving.  Held and Uthoff (1995), who examine fifteen Latin American countries, reach a
similar conclusion about the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign saving--their
estimates are clustered around -0.40 to -0.45.15  Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti (1992) also
find significant evidence of substitutability, although in their specification an increase in foreign
saving of one percent only reduces domestic saving by about 0.20 percent.  Gupta (1987),
however, concludes that increases in foreign saving increase domestic saving in Latin America but
have no effect on Asian countries' domestic saving.  Taken together, these results would imply
that an a temporary increase in foreign saving in both Asia and Latin America would either: i)
have a similar negative effects on domestic saving (Edwards, Held and Uthoff, and Schmidt-
Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti) or ii) increase saving in Latin America relative to Asia (Gupta). 
Neither scenario would appear to predict that Latin America will consume more of its capital
inflow than Asia.
d.  Could different policy responses account for the varied macroeconomic outcome?
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed description of the
macroeconomic policy response to the surge in capital inflows during the 1990s, the most
common policy response in both regions was to initially engage in sterilized intervention; as this
policy became too costly to sustain or the high interest rates it produced stimulated further
     16  See Reinhart and Dunaway (1996) for a detailed account on this issues. 
     17  On theoretical grounds one could establish both saving as a share of GDP and the capital
account balance-GDP ratio are bounded variables.  However, boundedness does not insure
stationarity.  
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inflows other measures were introduced.16  Measures to curb inflows (sometimes explicit, other
times in the form of prudential regulation) were often accompanied by efforts to increase
exchange rate flexibility.  Greater fiscal restraint was sought by a number of countries.  As
Reinhart and Dunaway (1996) conclude and on the basis of the "typical" policy profile just
described, it would be difficult to explain regional differences in the macroeconomic outcome on
the basis of a different policy response to the capital inflow.
f.  Some evidence for the “received wisdom”
Some empirical support for the received wisdom is presented in Antzoulatos (1996), who
regresses domestic demand (or its individual components) as a share of GDP on capital inflows
(also as a share of GDP).  For the Latin American countries, the coefficient on capital inflows is
positive and significant in the domestic demand equation as well as in the consumption equation
(which would imply a negative relationship with saving).  For the Asian countries, the coefficient
is negative although not significantly different from zero.  Hence, these results would appear to
accord well with the popular view.
However, Antzoulatos’s (1996) regression analysis is likely to suffer from specification
bias.  As the next section illustrates, in the overwhelming majority of cases, saving rates and (on
occasion) capital flows as a share of GDP are nonstationary variables.17  If either series (or both of
them) are nonstationary, then standard estimation strategies are not the adequate vehicle for
drawing inference.  Under these conditions, if we wish to draw conclusions about the effects of
     18  See Faruqee and Husain (1995) for a discussion.
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capital flows on domestic saving, then we must either ensure we identify a cointegrating vector
among the variables of interest, or we must work with the stationary, temporary or cyclical
components of the variables. 
Many of the recent studies reviewed in the previous subsection found that demographic
trends, financial deepening, and levels of per capita GDP systematically affect saving--indeed
these variables usually identify the long run behavior of saving--in other words, they are
associated with the stochastic trend. 18  Omission of these variables, in a specification such as
Antzoulatos (1996), is likely to result in a failure to obtain cointegration, limiting our ability to
draw inference from these results.
g.  Synthesis
The preceding review of the literature offers little empirical basis for the view that capital
inflows are negatively correlated in Latin America and positively correlated in Asia.  Estimates of
the IES  are similar in magnitude in the two regions; studies that have tested for the influence of
cultural factors on saving have found little evidence suggesting these are significant; liquidity
constraints are present in both regions, although these may affect a somewhat larger share of the
population in Latin America--yet consumption-smoothing models appear to fit the data better in
Latin America; and reduced form estimates of the degree of substitutability between domestic and
foreign saving suggest that domestic saving should respond similarly  to a surge in capital inflows
in both Asia and Latin America.
IV. Trends and Cycles in Domestic and Foreign Saving
The theoretical model sketched in Section II stressed the link between temporary
20
consumption booms (declines in domestic saving) and temporary increases in foreign saving.  Yet,
as noted, much of the popular discussion regarding the behavior of domestic saving in Asia and
Latin America during the capital inflows surge of the early 1990s have focussed on the level of
domestic saving in those two regions.  In what follows, we turn our attention to disentangling
trend from cycle in order to refine our understanding about how domestic saving in Asia and Latin
America responded to the surge in capital inflows in the 1990s and to assess to what extent the
received wisdom is an accurate description of their response.  
Our analysis focuses on domestic and foreign saving for nineteen countries in the
Caribbean and Latin America (listed in Table 4). Among the Asian countries we focus on the fast-
growing newly-industrialized economies (see Table 4).  With the exception of China, this group
includes the largest capital importers in the region.  The data used is annual and the period spans
1970 to 1995.  Particular emphasis is given to developments during the 1990s.
To decompose domestic and foreign saving into its trend (or permanent) and temporary
(or cyclical) component, we first establish the basic time-series properties of the variables in
question.  If a series is stationary, a simple deterministic trend captures the permanent component;
if the series is integrated of order one (I(1)), then there are alternative approaches to model the
stochastic trend and the cyclical fluctuations around that trend.  A nonstationary series can be
decomposed by a variety of filtering methods, such as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP), the Beveridge-
Nelson (BN), or the structural time series approach of Harvey (1985)--the Kalman filter (KF).  In
what follows, we adopt an ecclectic approach to decompose domestic and foreign saving into its
stochastic trend and cyclical component and rely on a variety of filtering methods to assess the
robustness of the results. We then revisit the issue of the substitutability of domestic and foreign
     19 These are not reported but are available upon request.
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saving by examining simple pairwise correlations between the cyclical components of the two
variables and compare the results of the Asian and Latin American countries.  The analysis is
conducted both on a regional and country-by-country basis.  An analysis of the comovement in
regional cyclical patterns concludes our results.
  a. Time series preliminaries
We begin our analysis by establishing the time series properties of the various variables of
interest indices via the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP)
unit root tests.  The form of the ADF test used allows for both the presence of a constant
(nonzero mean) and a constant deterministic drift.  As suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991),
we begin by including a generous number of lags; if the past differences do not enter significantly,
these are dropped sequentially.  The PP test, which allows for general forms of heteroscedasticity,
also included a constant and drift terms.
The results of the unit root tests uniformly indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root
could not be rejected at standard confidence levels in the overwhelming majority of cases.19   Of
course, caution must be exercised in interpreting these results as the low power of these tests is a
well known drawback. 
Given that in the majority of cases the variables of interest are nonstarionary, we next
apply all three filtering methods (BN, HP, and KF) to decompose the saving rate and the capital
account-GDP ratio into its "permanent" (or steady-state) component and "temporary" (or cyclical
component).  As discussed above, the identifying criteria for this technique is that the former
captures the nonstationary component of the variable, while the latter captures its stationary
     20For additional details see Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and Miller (1988).
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element.  
The BN method models the change in in the permanent component as an ARMA process
while the cyclical component is calculated residually as the difference between the estimated
permanent component and the actual values of the variables. 20   In our application, we use the
Box-Ljung Q statistic as a guideline for selecting the ARMA process so as to whiten the error.  In
general, the longer ARMA processes provided the best fit.  For the KF decomposition we
employed the trend plus cycle model (with no irregular component). The estimates of the KF
present a similar scenario to the HP filter and the BN decompositions.    
b.  Domestic and foreign saving
Table 4 examines the link between domestic and foreign saving by presenting the pairwise
correlations of their respective cyclical components, which are stationary by construction, so
standard inference tests apply.  Some observations stand out.
First, the overwhelming majority of countries the correlations between domestic and
foreign saving are negative.  Of the 24 countries in our sample 18 to 20 of them show a negative
correlation, depending on the filtering method used.  Among the remaining handful of countries
with positive correlations, none are statistically significant.  These results accord well with those
found in Edwards (1995), Holt and Uthoff (1995), Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti (1992),
which point to the substitutability of domestic and foreign saving.
Second, there is no evidence of sharp regional differences, as suggested by the popular
view.  The results presented in Table 4 do not support the view of sharp regionanotion that
foreign saving is a substitute for domestic saving in Latin America and a complement in Asia.  In
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     21 Let ñA and ñLA denote the correlations for Asia and Latin America, respectively, we define
The null hypothesis of no regional differences can be tested using Z (below); this yields a value of
0.206, which is not significantly different from zero.
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four out of the five Asian countries, the cyclical relationship between domestic and foreign saving
is negative--in three of those instances it is significantly so; in fourteen to sixteen (depending on
the filtering method) of the Latin American countries the correlation is negative and in over half
that number it is statistically significant.  The order of magnitude of the correlation is low in both
regions and it quite similar, ranging from -0.25 to -0.14 for Asia and -0.19 to -0.08 for Latin
America--in both cases the correlation is significant at the 10 percent level.  Indeed, we used a Z-
test to test for the significance of the difference between the correlation coefficients of a pair of
variables and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.21
Third, correlations between the cyclical component of domestic saving for the Asian
countries and the Latin American countries are positive ranging from 0.40 to0.51 and are
statistically significant (see Table 4).  The same applies to foreign saving correlations for the two
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regions, which range from 0.36 to 0.46.  Taken together, these results provide further evidence of
comovement and the importance of common external shocks in driving cross-border capital flows.
   V. Concluding Remarks
We have argued that the marked differences in saving behavior in Asia and Latin America
during the capital inflow surge of the 1990s do not stem from systematic regional differences of
how domestic saving responds in the short run to changes in foreign saving.  None of the evidence
we have reviewed here suggests: that preferences in the two regions significantly differ; that the
prevalence of liquidity constraints is markedly different across regions (although this is the most
promising of the hypotheses); that the macroeconomic policy response to the inflow of the 1990s
was consistently different in Asia than in Latin America; or that the cyclical components of capital
inflows and domestic saving are positively correlated in Asia and negatively correlated in Latin
America.  Indeed, we find domestic and foreign saving are inversely, significantly, and similarly
correlated in both regions.  Furthermore, the cyclical components of domestic saving and foreign
saving exhibit a significant degree of comovement across regions.
The key difference in saving behavior during the surge in capital inflows of the 1990s
between East Asia and Latin America does not appear to have a “short-run” explanation.  It is
rooted in the fact that the trend in the saving rate in East Asian economies has been significantly
positive in the past two decades, whereas for most Latin American countries saving ratios have
stagnated.  Hence, even when saving falls below trend, as it did in Asia during the early 1990s,
measured saving rates do not decline in absolute terms.
Based on these results, we argue that the emphasis popular opinion has placed on the
short-run response of domestic saving to a surge in capital inflows and the role accorded to this in
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insulating economies from the vagaries of international capital flows is misplaced.  Setting aside
the demographic factors, which are largely beyond the domain of stabilization policy, saving rates
fell in Latin America and not in Asia in the 1990s, not because of recent policy mistakes or
differences in the private sector response, but due to the cumulative effects of past policy
mistakes.  Some of the literature we have reviewed here suggests that financial deepening plays a
significant role in stimulating saving; financial deepening in Asia far outpaced the Latin American
experience, where high and chronic inflation often fueled an acute disintermediation process.  The
trends in per capita income, which have also been shown to influence saving, mimic the trends in
saving in the two regions, with a sharp upward trend in Asia and a much flatter profile in Latin
America.  Consistent with the previous observation, a recent literature has suggested that growth
causes saving and not the other way around.  In this regard, the performance during the past 15
years has also differed markedly in favor of the East Asian economies.  To the extent that this
highly differentiated track record largely reflects a series of past poor policy choices in many Latin
American countries, where failed inflation stabilization plans and chronic credibility problems have
abounded, one can conclude that the decline in saving rates in many Latin American countries in
the 1990s had secular, not cyclical, causes.
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Table 1.  Estimates of the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Rossi (1988): Panel data
Asian countries: Fiji, India, Indonesia1, Korea, Malaysia1, Pakistan, Philippines1, Sri Lanka, and Thailand1
Central America and the Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico1, and Panama
South America: Bolivia, Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru1, U guay, and Venezuela
Pooled estimate for the Asian countries: 0.07 (0.17)
Pooled estimate for Central America and the Caribbean: 0.37 (0.16)
Pooled estimate for South American countries: 0.09 (0.07)
Ostry and Reinhart (1992): Panel data
Asian countries:  India, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka
Latin America and the Caribbean:  Brazil1, Colombia1, Costa Rica, and Mexico1
Pooled estimate for the Asian countries: 0.80 (0.24)
Pooled estimate for the Latin American countries: 0.43 (0.14)
Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996): Panel data
Asian countries:  India, Pakistan, Philippines*, and Sri Lanka
Latin America and the Caribbean:  Brazil*, Colombia*, Costa Rica, and Mexico
Average for the Asian countries:  0.39
Average for the Latin American countries: 0.56
Average for the heavy capital inflow Asian countries: 0.54
Average for the heavy capita inflow Latin American countries: 0.60
Note: Standard errors are in paretheses.
1 Heavy capital inflow country during 1990s.
Table 2.  Testing for the Preference of Liquidity Constraints and Consumption Smoothing
Rossi (1988): Panel data
Asian countries: Fiji, India, Indonesia1, Korea, Malaysia1, Pakistan, Philippines1, Sri Lanka, and Thailand1
Central America and the Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico1, and Panama
South America: Bolivia, Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru1, U guay, and Venezuela
Share of households subject to liquidity constraints
Pooled estimate for the Asian middle-income countries: 0.17 (0.14)
Pooled estimate for the Asian low-income countries: 0.79 (0.39)
Pooled estimate for Central America and the Caribbean: 0.22 (0.21)
Pooled estimate for South American countries: 0.65 (0.12)
Rossi (1989): Panel data
Same country coverage as above.
Share of households subject to liquidity constraints
Pooled estimate for the Asian countries: 0.21 (0.12)
Pooled estimate for Central America and the Caribbean: 0.01 (0.29)
Pooled estimate for South American countries: 0.75 (0.18)
Haque and Montiel (1989)
Asian countries:  India, Indonesia1, Korea, Malaysia1, Philippines1, and Thailand1
Latin America and the Caribbean:  Jamaica and Peru1
Share of households subject to liquidity constraints
Average for the Asian countries:  0.39
Average for the Latin America and the Caribbean countries: 0.23
Average for the heavy capital inflow Asian countries: 0.44
Vaidyanathan (1993)
Asian countries:  Bangladesh, India, Malaysia1, P kistan, Singapore, Korea, and Sri Lanka
Latin America and the Caribbean:  Argentina1, Bolivi , Brazil1, Colombia1, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico1, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru1, Suriname and Uruguay
Share of households subject to liquidity constraints
Average for all the Asian countries:  0.47
Average for the Latin America and the Caribbean countries: 0.72
Average for the heavy capital inflow Asian countries: 0.45
Average for the heavy capita inflow Latin American countries: 0.56
Ghosh and Ostry (1995)
Asian countries:  Hong Kong, India, Indonesia1, Korea, Malaysia1, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines1,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand1.
Latin America and the Caribbean:   Argentina1, Bolivi , Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico1, Panama, Paraguay, Peru1, U guay, Venezuela.
Tests of consumption smoothing based on the detrended current account
Results:
Asia:  In 5 of the 11 countries the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing could be rejected by two or more
criteria.
Latin America and the Caribbean:  In 6 of the 16 countries the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing could be
rejected by two or more criteria.
Note: Standard errors are in paretheses.
1 Heavy capital inflow country during 1990s.
Table 3.  Reduced-form Saving Equations
Gupta (1987)
Asian countries:  India, Korea, Malaysia1, Pakistan, Philippines1, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand1.
Latin America and the Caribbean:   Bolivia, Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico1, Panama, Paraguay, Peru1, U guay, and Venezuela.
Temporary real income is significant in explaining saving in both regions; financial intermediation is significant
in Asia but not Latin America; increases in foreign saving ncre se domestic saving in Latin America, but is
insignificant in Asia.
Doshi (1994)
Asian countries:  Bangladesh, Bhutan, China1, Fiji, India, Indonesia1, Malaysia1, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines1, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand1, V uatu, and Western Samoa.
Latin America and the Caribbean:   Belize, Bolivia, Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico1, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru1, St. Vincent and Grenadian.
Demographic variables significant in both regions; life expectancy has a positive and significant effect on saving in
Asia but not Latin America and the Caribbean; real GNP growth and GDP per capita significant in Latin America
but not in Asia. 
Edwards (1995)
Asian countries:  Malaysia1, P kistan, Philippines1, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand1.
Latin America and the Caribbean:   Bolivia, Brazil1, Chile1, Colombia1, El Salvador, Mexico1, Paraguay, and
Venezuela.
Demographics, government saving, growth per capita, money/GDP ratio, private sector credit, expenditures on
social security, and foreign saving are significant determinants of private saving in both regions; GDP per capita is
significant in Latin America but not elsewhere; and the proportion of the population living in urban areas, which is
expected to reduce the need for precautionary saving, is significant in Latin America but not elsewhere; there are
no significant regional differences in the response of domestic saving to foreign saving.  Lower growth, higher
dependency ratios, and a far slower degree of financial deepening appear to account for the lower saving rates
observed in Latin America.   
Faruqee and Husain (1995)
Asian countries: Indonesia1, M laysia1, Singapore, and Thailand1
Percent of population that is working age is the most important determinant of the trend in private saving;
financial deepening and compulsory saving plans have an important effect on the trend in some cases.  Short-run
dynamics are affected by growth.
Held and Uthoff (1995)
Latin American countries: Brazil1, Colombia1, Costa Rica, Chile1, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico1, Panama, Paraguay, Peru1, U guay, Venezuela
Per capita income, inflation, growth, the dependency ratio, terms of trade, and foreign saving significantly affect
national saving.  Foreign and domestic saving are substitutes.
Testing for Cultural Effects
Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994)
Using data from the Canadian Survey of Family Expenditures, th  study tests whether cultural factors influence
saving by comparing the saving patterns of immigrants from different parts of the world to Canada.  They find no
evidence of differences.
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1 Heavy capital inflow country during 1990s.
Table 4. Saving and Capital Flows, 1970-1995: East Asia and Latin America
(as a percent of GDP, cyclical components)
HP filter Kalman filter BN filter
Country Correlation t-statistic         Correlation t-statistic Correlation t-
statistic
or Region Coefficient          Coefficient Coefficient
East Asia1 -0.14 -1.75        -0.25 -1.89 -0.20 -1.97
Indonesia -0.37 -1.96        -0.46 -2.07 -0.32  -2.11
Korea     -0.61 -3.77        -0.56 -3.02 -0.72 -4.06
Malaysia -0.06 -0.28        -0.15 -1.22  0.02  0.13
Singapore -0.03 -0.17        -0.14 -1.84 -0.16 -1.77
Thailand  0.06  0.28        -0.25 -0.10 -0.12 -0.32
Latin America2 -0.08 -1.88        -0.12 -2.01 -0.19 -1.98
Argentina -0.28 -1.47        -0.32 -1.76 -0.19 -1.89
Bolivia  0.12  0.61        -0.03 -0.54  0.21  0.14
Brazil  0.03  0.16         0.08  0.60 -0.02 -0.04
Chile  0.20  1.01         0.12  0.76  0.23  0.86
Colombia -0.50 -2.88        -0.64 -3.01 -0.69 -3.21
Costa Rica -0.37 -1.96        -0.50 -2.56 -0.42 -2.13
Dominican 
   Republic -0.45 -2.51        -0.48 -2.16 -0.60 -3.14
Ecuador -0.39 -2.08        -0.47 -2.67 -0.32 -1.99
El Salvador -0.06 -0.30         0.03  0.04 -0.10 -0.23
Guatemala  0.12  0.61         0.10  0.43 -0.01 -0.14
Haiti -0.60 -3.64        -0.47 -2.93 -0.56 -3.44
Honduras -0.06 -0.29        -0.26 -1.68 -0.19 -1.73
Nicaragua -0.51 -2.94        -0.62 -3.12 -0.55 -3.02
Mexico -0.25 -1.28        -0.32 -1.65 -0.36 -1.69
Panama -0.13 -0.65         0.12  0.30 -0.04 -0.33
Peru -0.10 -0.48        -0.08 -1.02 -0.15 -0.46
Paraguay -0.51 -2.90        -0.65 -3.02 -0.56 -3.01
Uruguay  0.06  0.32        -0.02 -0.14  0.04  0.12
Venezuela -0.27 -1.37        -0.35 -1.89 -0.22 -1.69
Asia and Latin America Correlations:
Domestic Saving0.44 2.17          0.51 2.03 0.40 1.92
Foreign Saving0.36 2.34          0.42 2.77 0.46 2.32
Notes: Standard errors are estimated using Hansen’s GMM estimator and allowing for heteroskedastic
disturbances.  
1 Based on a panel of 130 observations (i.e. five countries 26 years each).
2 Based on a panel of 494 observations (i.e. 19 countries 26 years each)
